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This article takes stock of the situation caused by the Asian
financial crisis and analyses the various proposals made for
dealing with it so as to avoid its repetition; it is concluded that
financial globalization has destabilized the potentially favour-
able effects of the process of opening up to international trade
and productive investment. It notes that while the 1997 finan-
cial crisis did not have the deflationary consequences of the
1929 crisis, thanks to the institutional changes made when pol-
icy-makers reacted to it, the generalization of export-led
growth strategies tends to repeat situations of over-production,
further aggravated by the volatility of international capital
flows. There is now a feeling that the twenty-first century
should mark a dual turning-point: on the one hand, a better
balance should be sought between domestic growth and out-
ward-looking policies, and on the other hand –and above all– a
number of reforms designed to avoid further great financial
crises should be put into effect. A debate is currently under
way on the relative merits of various options in this respect:
negotiation of a new international system; a Brady Plan for
banks; stricter application of prudential regulations; greater
transparency of short-term capital movements; the expansion
of new options markets, or even the establishment of a Tobin
Tax. It would be dangerous to make major structural changes
in the productive and social organization of the world’s econo-
mies solely in response to the pressures of the international fi-
nancial markets. Lastly, the formation of regional integration
areas represents a middle way between internationalization in
all directions and a protectionist withdrawal behind national
frontiers. At all events, notable changes may be expected com-
pared with the 1990s.
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I
Introduction
The 1990s seems to have marked a turning-point in
the crisis which began in the late 1960s in the United
States and spread from there to the other developed
countries through the effects of the oil shocks. The
Fordist production model had been gradually losing
its effectiveness and was making way for new princi-
ples which the Japanese seemed to have discovered
and applied with singular efficiency: to such a point
that in the 1980s some analysts forecast the
“Japanization” of production systems and indeed of
the Western economies in general.
The present situation, at the close of the 1990s,
is very different, however: the internationalization of
trade and production, and even more so the growing
force of financial innovations and their spread all
over the world, mark a new stage with new types of
rules. From now on, growth patterns will be based on
the exploration of all aspects of foreign competition
and the form of incorporation in international finan-
cial networks. In this respect, the United States econ-
omy would appear to be leading the way for the
other countries, which must adjust in one way or an-
other to this new model governed by finance.
The present study seeks to make a critical analy-
sis of this view of the situation, which is now widely
held. It shows that the process of internationalization
of trade and production must not be viewed in the
same light as the financial globalization process. Fi-
nancial crises can spread very rapidly from one
country to another, but national situations and regu-
latory systems continue to be very diverse. Thus, the
dominant role of financial considerations is above all
a feature of the United States and British economies
and applies very little to Germany and Japan, to
name only two examples of alternatives to a type of
capitalism dominated by pure market forces. More-
over, while it is quite true that moderate speculation
tends to stabilize the functioning of goods and ser-
vices markets, excessive accentuation of this process
has a potentially destabilizing effect on financial
markets. If we accept this interpretation, then it is
important to discipline finances. At the same time,
however, it must be recognized that not all econo-
mies have an export-led growth pattern, so it would
not be possible to apply the same political economy
precepts everywhere.
The study closes with a comparative analysis of
the different solutions proposed for overcoming the
potential imbalances marking the current interna-
tional economy. The ideal solution would be to nego-
tiate a new international financial architecture, but
this raises formidable political problems.
II
Finances for better or for worse
The last fifteen years have been marked by the de-
regulation of national financial systems, the prolifer-
ation of innovations in terms of new financial
instruments, and the de-territorialization of certain
markets, to such a point that most national regulatory
systems have been significantly changed. Govern-
ments decided to engage in this deregulation in the
hope of furthering investment, economic growth and
employment, without prejudice to the smooth prog-
ress of the economic situation (Aglietta, Brender and
Coudert, 1990). This trend was observed both in the
great industrialized nations and in the emerging
economies, where it was reflected in the rapid impor-
tation of the most sophisticated financial instruments
from Wall Street and the City. It is therefore hardly
surprising that the institutions previously governing
the growth patterns of most countries have fallen out
 This study was prepared for CEPAL Review on the basis of
the updating and expansion of a text originally published in
French in Techniques financières et développement, No. 53-54,
December 1998.
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of step with the new financial system resulting from
opening up to these innovations.
Looking back, the contradictory effects of this
opening up to international finance may be summa-
rized as follows (figure 1):
- On the one hand, when foreign capital inflows
take the form of direct investmen they help to form
new production capacity incorporating the latest
technological advances, because the aim of the trans-
nationals in the 1990s has been to build up a produc-
tion base in selected countries which will ensure
their international competitiveness. This strategy is
diametrically opposed to that aimed at import substi-
tution. If the macroeconomic conditions are stable
enough and the capital flows continue for a decade or
so, it may be expected that the growth in exports will
finally make it possible to repay the external indebt-
edness involved (in this case, private). This trend rep-
resents a change from the 1980s, when international
loans went to finance public deficits. This is the
“virtuous” side of globalization, with international
borrowing making it possible to anticipate higher
rates of national saving while speeding up growth.
However, there is another and more dubious con-
sequence.
- Thus, on the other hand investment also takes
the form of diversification of stock and bond portfo-
lios, giving rise to the concept of an “emerging mar-
ket”. Its effects on the improvement of production
efficiency may be seen on the opposite side of the
“virtuous circle” referred to above. At first, there is
an abundant supply of credit, reflected in a real estate
boom, strong expansion of consumer credit, and the
purchase of stocks and shares, giving rise to a specu-
lative “bubble” from which none of the reputedly
promising countries has escaped, either in Latin
America or Asia (Contamin and Lacu, 1998). Asset
price inflation, sometimes a fall in the rate of saving,
and the shift in production from exports to the do-
mestic market bring on a vicious circle which runs
counter to the “virtuous circle” that it was anticipated
would prevail when it was decided to introduce fi-
nancial liberalization. If the exchange rate is kept sta-
ble in terms of another reference currency (often the
US dollar), this is sufficient to cause inflationary
pressures to be reflected in a deterioration in the
FIGURE 1
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trade balance, which, once it goes beyond a certain
level, finally puts the international community on
the alert and brings on the withdrawal of short-term
capital (UNCTAD, 1998, pp. 59-76).
The drama for Mexico, then Indonesia, Thailand
and South Korea, is that this turnaround in the judge-
ment of the financial markets took place before the
benefits of technological and industrial moderniza-
tion had been garnered. Thus, in these countries fi-
nancial liberalization brought on a series of crises of
an unprecedented nature which took finance minis-
ters and central bankers by surprise. Moreover, the
events which took place shed doubts on the strategy
and adjustment plans of the International Monetary
Fund, which are based on a very simple idea: one
model, one crisis, one cure for all.
More generally, international finance has made
the process of accumulation and consumption ex-
tremely flexible in the short and medium term, but
with the accompanying risk of increasing the sever-
ity of the financial and economic crisis that follows
the period of boom and speculation. Over-adjustment
–both upward and downward– is a marked feature of
the financial markets. While it is well known that all
financial bubbles eventually burst, as demonstrated
in the notable history of such phenomena by Charles
Kindleberger (1978), it is not so normal for them to
culminate in a wide-ranging cumulative depression.
The only precedent for the crisis of the late 1990s is
the Great Depression experienced from 1929 to
1932. However, economic and financial history
teaches us that crises follow but do not resemble
each other, since the institutional reforms made in
order to overcome them give rise to new forms of
regulation which can in turn suffer a new kind of
structural crisis (Boyer and Saillard (eds.), 1995).
III
A global financial crisis, but with
a variety of national situations
Does adjustment, which is often dramatically severe,
take the same form in all countries? If the hypothesis
that globalization is a factor leading to unprece-
dented coherence of the international system were
correct, then such uniformity should actually be ob-
served, subject to a few points of divergence due to
the persistence of national institutions still in the
course of standardization. In fact, however, global-
ization represents a new form of interdependence of
national economies rather than a force which homog-
enizes them and blends them in a great melting-pot
(Boyer, 1997; Lafay, Freudenberg, Herzog and
Ünal-Kesenci, 1999).
This can be seen directly from an analysis of the
mechanisms by which the Asian crisis was transmit-
ted (figure 2). Three main mechanisms are involved:
- First, the Asian countries were obliged to ac-
cept a structural adjustment plan in order to obtain
IMF aid. Such plans, however, were originally pre-
pared for countries suffering from heavy public defi-
cits and lax monetary management, rather than
systemic fragility of the banking system. What hap-
pened was that, under the influence of a rapid liberal-
ization process, there was a failure to introduce the
prudential mechanisms and control bodies which
proved necessary in the developed countries in order
to avoid major financial crises (Williamson and
Mahar, 1999; Aglietta, 1995 and 1998). Conse-
quently, the rise in interest rates, the contraction in
public expenditure, the pressures to open up the do-
mestic market, and the acquisition of local firms by
foreign interests, as well as the questioning of the la-
bour laws protecting wage-earners, are all factors
which helped to accentuate the contraction in activity
in each country in the first stage. This unfavourable
evolution further weakened the banking system and
favoured the build-up of fresh bad debts. It is note-
worthy that a completely opposite policy was applied
in the United States in the fall of 1998: a reduction in
the Federal Reserve interest guidelines relieved the
pressure on the hedge funds, whose ill-advised spec-
ulation could have brought on a systemic crisis.
- Second, most of the newly industrialized coun-
tries had obvious excess capacity when the specula-
tive bubble burst (Hochraich, 1999; Godement,
1999). As the adjustment plans sought to reduce do-
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mestic demand, local enterprises turned their efforts
towards outside markets. As this was a generalized
trend, there was a considerable drop in export prices,
which intensified competition with other countries
and often led to devaluation of their currencies. This
occurred in Southeast Asia, but it was also present in
Latin America. The examples of the electronics or
motor industries are sufficient to show how the strat-
egy of seeking to export to the world market has led
to excess capacity all over the world. It was through
this mechanism that the crisis in the Asian countries
spread to the most prosperous economies in both
North America and Europe. Its effect was favourable
as regards inflation control, which is the obsession of
the central banks, but its effect on the profits of the
great transnationals was more dubious, and it had re-
percussions in terms of the instability of stock mar-
ket prices on Wall Street and most of the other
markets. After a period of corrections following the
August 1998 Russian crisis, the boom in stock prices
resumed even more strongly on Wall Street, in the
name of a “flight to quality”. In view of the reigning
uncertainty in Asia, the sluggishness of the Japanese
economy and the dismal situation in Europe in the
first half of 1999, capital flooded into the United
States, starting the speculative bubble all over again.
- Third, the international commodity market is a
good barometer for judging the world situation. As
Asia had been the most dynamic growth area, the
downturn in activity reduced the demand for oil and
for primary commodities in general. This is why
countries as different as Canada, Norway, Russia and
Venezuela were finally affected by the Asian finan-
cial crisis, albeit a year later. These developments
had repercussions on the expected profits and stock
values of the oil companies and those operating on
the commodities markets. Even in the commodity-
producing countries, the crisis had very special ef-
fects: how could what happened in the case of Nor-
way be compared with the effects in Russia, Canada
or Venezuela? Forms of regulation remain basically
national, but they are subject to shocks which are no
FIGURE 2
Why did the Asian crisis spread to the rest of the world,
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longer purely domestic but increasingly international
(Berger and Dore (eds.), 1995; Hollingsworth and
Boyer (eds.), 1997).
So once again we see the diversity of national
reactions:
- In Russia, the move towards a finance-based
model further destabilized a production system
which was already in a very bad way as a result of
growing imbalances and opening-up to international
trade, even in the case of the most essential goods,
such as agricultural products (Sapir, 1996).
- In the United States, the financial crisis only
began to make itself felt in October 1998, when the
whiplash effect of the summer 1997 financial crisis
showed up on the books of the big American cor-
porations. Thanks to the stock market recovery,
however, optimism very soon returned and bol-
stered faith in the emergence of a “New Economy”
which would enjoy steady growth and be free from
the dangers of both inflation and recession (The
Economist, 1999a).
- Japan, for its part, has been experiencing ever
since 1991 the difficulty of running a liberalized
banking system which is in the midst of a speculative
bubble and is hence incapable of solving the problem
of bad debts for itself. The evolution of the dol-
lar/yen exchange rate has set the pace at which the
Japanese crisis has developed (McKinnon, 1999).
Massive budgetary injections and an interest rate
close to zero barely served to stave off recession,
which finally broke out in the first quarter of 1997.
- In a sense, the Southeast Asian nations have
been experiencing a situation of the same type since
1997, although in their case it has been much more
violently marked because their form of domestic
regulation lacks the stabilizing elements of the Japa-
nese economy (Godement, 1999). Once again, how-
ever, it should be noted that there are great contrasts
between the way the respective situations evolved
in South Korea, Thailand and Indonesia.
- The Latin American countries were also caught
in the storm and their policy-makers have been thor-
oughly disconcerted. As the Minister of Finance of
Mexico said in mid-1998: “How is it that Mexico
finds itself in a crisis, when the government has
followed all the instructions of the international
organizations?”. The differences between the mone-
tary policies of Argentina and Brazil led to sharp
exchange-rate fluctuations which threatened to
destabilize MERCOSUR.
- Finally, in Europe the launching of the Euro
has made it possible to stabilize exchange rates
among the eleven countries participating in this exer-
cise, which fully vindicates the idea of European
monetary integration in a sense, but since January
1999 there has been the problem of the international
financial markets’ appraisal of the viability of this
new currency. The difficulties in coordinating na-
tional budgetary policies and the conflicts over the
strategy of the European Central Bank have naturally
heightened the suspicions of the financial commu-
nity, made wary of risks by their recent experience.
The depreciation of the Euro with respect to the dol-
lar between January and August 1999 is as much a
result of the differences in situations and in monetary
policies between Europe and America as of the diffi-
culty of giving birth to a new currency in a context of
globalized financial markets (Boyer, 1999a).
IV
The trend towards a finance-based model
is still very uneven between countries
The persistence of marked differences between the
paths followed by individual countries suggests that
globalization is far from having taken possession of
all countries and hence transforming all their domes-
tic economic institutions. This disparity between
transnationalizing financial innovations and national
institutions may be interpreted in two different ways,
however.
- It may be considered, for example, that the
magnitude of the crisis in the Asian countries is due
to their delay in adopting all the rules of a fully de-
veloped financial economy, so that financial open-
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ness has not been accompanied by the corresponding
modernization of risk management facilities (Wil-
liamson and Mahar, 1999). Consequently, govern-
ments should press on with the importation of the
kind of rules and control bodies which govern the fi-
nancial systems of the United States or Great Britain:
traditionally the countries which have gone furthest
in innovations and risk management. This is clearly
the question for Japan. It is also clear, however, that
the other domestic institutions should be reformed
accordingly too, since the maintenance of the highest
and stablest yields possible, as demanded by pension
funds, for example, is not generally compatible with
the codification of wage relations or the style of
management practiced by the State. This is why in
South Korea, for example, the question of more
flexible labour regulations has come up once again
after the 1997 crisis.
- In contrast, it may be considered that the pres-
ent financial crisis is simply another episode, coming
after many others (Kindleberger, 1978), in which
speculation has tried to break loose from the eco-
nomic and social constraints which previously af-
fected it, but in which a crisis has very soon occurred
whose severity shows the non-viability of a system
governed solely by finance: a subject dear to the
heart of John Maynard Keynes (1935), and also of
Karl Polanyi (1946). According to this second inter-
pretation, it is necessary to bring back some disci-
pline into financial innovation in order to make it
comply with the need to stabilize the international
economy and ensure steady accumulation of produc-
tive capital at the national level (Orléan, 1998 and
1999). In this respect, is it not noteworthy that the
economies where financial liberalization has been
carried out in a prudent manner (Germany, India) or
where productive capital has been made welcome
but not speculative funds (Chile before 1998) have
registered a much more controlled evolution, without
major crises, in spite of the world economic upsets
around them?
Indeed, the fact is that by no means all countries
are on the verge of adopting a new system of accu-
mulation governed entirely by finance (table 1). Only
the so-called Anglo-Saxon countries, headed by the
United States, are serious candidates for such a sys-
tem, for the proportion of their wealth held in the
form of stocks and shares is high with respect to their
disposable income and seems to play some part in a
particularly high propensity to consume which,
moreover, increases still further as the financial in-
vestments of American households develop. In Sep-
tember 1998, the rate of saving in the United States
became negative (-0.2%) because households fi-
nanced their consumption by resorting to credit: a
situation without precedent since 1959. Furthermore,
the Stock Exchange is an essential means of capital
allocation and control over the way firms are run,
through, for example, the pursuit of much higher
yields than in Europe or Asia. In contrast, Germany
is very far from having these characteristics, which
no doubt explains the different types of evolution
observed on the opposite sides of the Atlantic.
The other European countries, as well as Japan,
are also a long way from adopting the finance-based
economic model, and this is not necessarily a handi-
TABLE 1
The North American economy is based on
finance to an exceptionally high degree
United Great Canada Japan Germany FranceStates Britain
1. Propensity to consume, 1996 0.95 0.926 0.956 0.869 0.884 0.908
2. Stock holdings/disposable
income, 1997 (%) 145 75 95 30 25 20
3. Capital gains/disposable income (%) 35.5 15 11 -7 7 5
4. Share of stocks and bonds in
financial assets of households 28.4 52.4 ... 25.3 21.3 14.5
5. Money market rate 5.34 7.38 5.20 0.32 3.5 3.46
6. Yield on bonds 6.51 5.59 7.30 1.06 3.97 4.23
7. Reference yield (%) 12-16 12-16 12-16 5 6-7 9
Source: Line 1: Keizai Koho Center (1998, p. 97). Lines 2 and 3: The Economist (1998, p. 129). Line 4: Japan Almanac (1998). Line 5:
The Economist (1998, p. 129).
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cap, as we can see by comparing some major perfor-
mance indicators: in these countries, productivity
grows at roughly the same pace as in the United
States or Great Britain, and at the end of the 1990s
their firms are making perfectly satisfactory profits,
but income distribution is much fairer than in the
highly finance-based countries (Boyer, 1999b).
It is by no means obvious that European and
Japanese policy-makers should force the pace of fi-
nancial liberalization in order to meet the demands of
globalization. This advice is often proffered to Japan,
which is recommended to import most of America’s
institutions if the government intends to try to over-
come the serious crisis of the 1990s (Dornbush,
1998), but in fact it would appear to be easier, wiser
and finally just as effective simply to make marginal
reforms in the institutions inherited from the time of
rapid growth. To be sure, the persistence and magni-
tude of unemployment in Europe and its rapid in-
crease in Japan naturally shed some doubts on the
viability of the institutions governing labour relations
and the labour market, but the cost/advantage bal-
ance is not weighed clearly in favour of an Ameri-
can-type model (table 2). As Richard Freeman
(1998) noted, contrary to general belief, the United
States has not by any means reached a kind of eco-
nomic nirvana, except in the case of the richest
households, and it would not be advisable for Europe
–even if it were possible– to imitate the American
model in all its details. The example of Britain points
in the same direction: adoption of a finance-based
model has increased inequality without having much
effect on firms’ efficiency (Froud, Haslam, Johal,
Leaver, Williams and Williams, 1998).
TABLE 2
North American capitalism is not so
superior in terms of efficiency
Efficiency of Access to Distribution of Social justice.
employment and Ratio of male workers’
companies hours worked fruits of growth wages, deciles 9 and 1
Growth rate Growth Growt Size of
Profit- of manufac- Hours rate of Unem- rate of public Annual
ability, turing worked employ- ployment consump- and rate
1997 product- per ment, rate tion, social 1979 1995 of
(%) ivity, year, 1990- (August 1990- transfers/ change
1990-1997 1996 1998 1998) 1997 GNP (%)
(%) (%) (%) (%)
Countries which
adopted liberalism
United States ... 3.2 1 986 1.3 4.6 2.4 32.0 3.18 4.35 +2.7
Great Britain 10.4 3.9 1 926 0 6.3 1.8 39.7 2.45 3.31 +2.0
Countries with a
strong public tradition
Germany 14.5 2.7 1 517 -0.6 10.7 1.8 47.7 2.38 2.25 -1.3
France 15.9 2.8 1 679 0.1 11.8 1.2 54.1 3.39 3.43 +0.2
Meso-corporativist
countries
Japan 12.8 2.2 1 993 0.6 4.3 2.0 35.2 2.59 2.77 +1.2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Source: Columns 1, 2, 4, 5, 6 and 7: OECD, 1998 (calculations made on the basis of the statistical annex). Column 3: Japan Almanac,
1999, p, 107.  Columns 8, 9 and 10: Richard Freeman, 1998, p. 44.
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V
The great financial crises follow
but do not resemble each other
This interpretation has important implications for un-
derstanding the crisis that broke out in 1997, spread
to the rest of the world, and got worse in the fall of
1998. The spectre of a return to the catastrophic
chains of events observed between 1929 and 1932
once again haunts the financial community and the
international organizations. A step by step compari-
son, enlightened by regulation theory (Aglietta,
1976; Boyer and Saillard (eds.), 1995), tends to tone
down these conclusions, however (table 3).
At a certain level of abstraction, there is no
shortage of analogies between 1929 and 1998.
- For a start, a series of speculative bubbles
ended up by bursting, first in Japan in 1990, then in
the Southeast Asian countries in 1997, and finally in
the United States in the fall of 1998. It should be
noted, however, that the order of the crises was dif-
ferent from that of the 1930s: at that time it was the
United States economy which was hit first by the
outbreak of the financial crisis which then spread to
the other developed economies and finally to the “pe-
riphery”. In the 1990s, the opposite took place as a
direct result of the booms on the emerging markets,
which thus brought the instability of the centre to the
periphery. However, the more highly developed and
firmly established prudential control arrangements in
North America slowed down the spread of the crisis
associated with the bursting of the Asian financial
bubble. Paradoxically, these uneven degrees of finan-
cial maturity sent financial flows back towards Wall
Street as from late 1998/early 1999. However, the
weakening yield/risk ratio and the fact that the finan-
cial yield tends to be higher than the economic yield
proper shed doubts on the long-term viability of the
path followed by the United States economy since
1991 (Artus and Debonneuil, 1999).
- Secondly, the accumulation regime displays
certain similarities. In many countries, it is marked
by a profit rate which is considerably higher than in
the 1980s, but with insufficient demand to keep up
such a level of profitability in the long term. It is
therefore a crisis of realization rather than of valua-
tion which looms on the horizon. The United States
is an exception to this, but in 1997 most of the other
OECD countries were in a situation rather reminiscent
of that prevailing when the 1929 crisis broke out in
the United States. The effects of the existence of ex-
cess capacity were naturally heightened by the slump
in demand from the Asian countries. So far, the
United States has been the “buyer of last resort”, but
a conjunctural turnaround in that country would as-
suredly reveal the magnitude of the imbalances
which have built up at the world level (Brenner,
1998). A second paradox is that most of the devel-
oped countries still have a growth regime driven by
domestic consumption (Bowles and Boyer, 1995),
whereas almost all governments base their policy de-
cisions on the hypothesis that growth is conditioned
by profit and competitiveness. This error of diagno-
sis was already present in the 1930s.
- The third point of similarity is that the interna-
tional financial system presses in favour of down-
ward readjustments, which obliges countries with an
external-sector deficit to adopt austerity plans,
whereas the countries with a surplus have no incen-
tive (or are unable, like Japan) to reactivate their
economies, since the financial fragility of the banks
leads to a generalized “wait and see” attitude with re-
gard to investment and consumption. Moreover, fi-
nancial adjustments can be brutal and rapid, whereas
adjustments in economic activity and specialization
continue to be much slower. This great lesson from
the General Theory remains fully valid in these times
of electronic money and globalized finance. In 1929,
too, the speed with which the financial crisis spread
was a decisive factor in the size of the depression and
the contraction in economic activity.
- Lastly, even at a time which is supposed to be
marked by globalization there is still no suprana-
tional system of regulation to ensure the viability of a
variety of national growth regimes governed by fi-
nance. Although it is quite true that there are interna-
tional organizations such as the IMF and the Bank for
International Settlements which are responsible for
preventing financial crises, it is equally true that they
do not have the financial or political resources to in-
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TABLE 3
From a financial crisis to a structural crisis:
a comparison of 1929 with 1998
1929 1998
Nature of system of accumulation
United States Intensive, without mass consumption Extensive, with differentiation of consump-
tion
Other industrialized countries Intensive, without mass consumption Moderately intensive, governed by competi-
tiveness
Non-industrialized countries Dependent on foreign capital and exports
Ranking of institutional forms Dynamism of finance Globalized finance controls companies and
governments
Wave of concentration Wave of concentration in response to de-
mands of financial markets
Largely competitive wage relations Erosion of wage earners’ bargaining power
State not supposed to be interventionist Indebtedness of State limits autonomy of eco-
nomic policy
Multi-polar international order United States has leadership power, but the
world is of a multi-polar nature
Sources of crisis
United States Excessively high profits compared with
effective demand
Speculation feeds consumption and conceals
the imbalance in the accumulation system
Speculation in financial markets Profits demanded by finance are not compati-
ble with the long-term profit rate
Other industrialized countries (such as
France, for example)
Excessively high profits compared with
effective demand
Imbalances in the accumulation system are
transmitted to external markets (excess capac-
ity; pursuit of trade surpluses)
Financial crises are transmitted to the domes-
tic economy
Recently industrialized countries Discrepancy between time-scale of finance
(attraction of capital) and time-scale of pro-
duction (generation of a trade surplus)
IMF adjustment plans aggravate the imbal-
ances
General situation
World Fall in commodity prices Fall in commodity prices
Rapid shifts of capital Instability of capital movements
United States Optimism of agents: “A New Era” New economy with constant growth
Over-valuation of stock markets Over-valuation of stock markets
More erratic evolution of stock prices Great instability of stock prices
Federal Reserve Bank reluctant to inter-
vene
Federal Reserve Bank conscious of danger of
a systemic collapse
Growth paralysed by stock market
crisis
Dynamic growth continues, but profits are
under stress
Japan Deflation of assets since 1992, general defla-
tion since 1997
Contraction in credit due to bad debts and un-
certainty
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tervene when there is a “domino effect” serial col-
lapse that results in a major crisis that could exhaust
their resources and means of intervention. The recap-
italization of the IMF agreed at the end of October
1998 (Camdessus, 1998) and the guidelines given by
the Group of Seven (G-7) bear witness to the aware-
ness of the danger that financial instability represents
for the cohesion of the world system, but this does
not mean that the arms available to the international
organizations are in keeping with the dangers in-
volved in a possible recurrence of speculation. Thus,
for example, the fact that the IMF granted Brazil a
line of credit for US$ 41 billion (IMF, 1998a) to ward
off speculative movements still did not prevent the
brutal devaluation of the Real after the Brazilian
Presidential elections.
Thus, although there are some common features
between 1929 and 1998, closer analysis of the forms
of regulation and strategies adopted by governments
reveals some notable differences.
- In the old industrialized economies, the
wage-earning society continues to set the form of
regulation, through a closely-knit network of interde-
pendent institutions. The relative inertia of adjust-
ments in employment, hiring and the collective
negotiation of wages, the existence of a minimum
wage, the breadth and diversity of coverage of social
security and the existence of unemployment insur-
ance are all typical features of a form of labour rela-
tions which in many countries –especially in Europe-
prevents a slump in consumption and hence in eco-
nomic activity. This is one of the hidden stabilizers
which prevented the repetition after the first oil
shock of the catastrophic episodes that took place be-
tween the wars. On the other hand, however, this in-
stitutional stability can prevent changes in the form
of regulation and the establishment of a development
regime more in keeping with both domestic and in-
ternational constraints.
- A second difference from the 1930s is that
previously the countries of the periphery were
mainly suppliers of raw materials and semi-pro-
cessed goods for the industrialized economies,
whereas now much of the production of the South-
east Asian countries and some of the Latin American
countries takes the form of manufactures which com-
pete with the products of the OECD countries. For this
reason, the excess of manufacturing capacity is no
longer observed only in the United States or Europe,
but at the world level, in the newly industrialized
countries, including China, which has made rapid
progress since 1978 in its process of industrialization
and entry into the world market. The crisis of excess
production is therefore much more difficult to handle
now, since it affects different countries: it is a poten-
tial source of international economic conflicts, and
this makes it all the harder to find a positive solution
for the present difficulties. We are thus now involved
in a dangerous and potentially zero-sum game in-
stead of the positive-sum game of the past.
The experience of the catastrophic chains of
events of the 1930s (financial crisis –competitive de-
valuation– withdrawal into protectionism –rising na-
tionalism– world conflict) continues to exert a
powerful influence on the political and economic
leaders of the 1990s, even though few of them actu-
ally lived through these episodes. Thus, in mid-1998
the President of the United States, the President of
the Federal Reserve Board, the top executives of the
World Bank and the IMF, and the Finance Ministers
of the Group of Seven all proclaimed their intention
of preventing the financial crisis from degenerating
into an economic depression. This is why the great
financial crises follow but do not necessarily resem-
ble each other.
This is the central message of regulation theory:
the great crises follow one another, but never in an
identical form, because it is typical of capitalism that
it evolves in a spiral, never passing twice through the
same configuration (Boyer, 1999b). Such an eco-
nomic system favours ongoing innovation, and crises
and conflicts give rise to the readjustment of institu-
tional forms, which are thus marked by a strong his-
torical element and notable irreversibility. Each
structural crisis tends to be new and original in terms
of the interaction of its causes and transmission
mechanisms. This is a challenge to the current neo-
classical theories, which claim instead that the deter-
minants of macroeconomic balance remain
unchanged in space and time.
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VI
Disciplining world finance:
a New Deal for the twenty-first century?
All is not for the best in the best of worlds: since the
Asian crisis broke out in 1997 belief in the
self-balancing nature of the financial market has
been severely shaken and the Russian crisis in 1998
led to further questioning of this eminently optimis-
tic conception. In this respect, it is significant that
the financial press has now begun to talk about a new
“New Deal” centered on the debt problem (Business
Week, 1998, p. 60). This proposal is interesting from
more than one point of view.
Firstly, it comes from the big industrial corpora-
tions, which have noted that the expansion of global-
ized finance, which was supposed to facilitate their
operations and raise their profitability, may in fact
prove harmful to them, because it gives rise to insta-
bility on product markets and fosters phases of con-
traction of bank credits which affect both consumption
and investment. This is a message which had already
been highlighted by the first studies on speculation:
while a little speculation may stabilize product mar-
kets, its generalized spread to finance brings major
instability (Kaldor, 1940). In the face of growing
uncertainty, imitative forms of behaviour become gen-
eral, thus tending to increase the likelihood and mag-
nitude of financial bubbles (Aglietta and Orléan,
eds., 1998). Last but not least, financial globalization
creates great uncertainty about the evolution of ex-
change rates, interest rates, and even the very direc-
tion of national economic policies and hence also of
growth. The way financial liberalization and global-
ization evolve brings to mind the image of the sor-
cerer’s apprentice, overwhelmed by his own creations.
Secondly, the choice of the term “New Deal” is
enlightening because it contrasts with the meaning
this term had for the Unite States after the economic
collapse in 1929. At that time, financial and banking
activity was strongly regulated once again: for ex-
ample, the law prohibited deposit banks from carry-
ing on activities with stocks and securities, precisely
in order to avoid the sources of systemic fragility
which manifested themselves once again in the
1990s. The new situation was therefore related
mainly to the status of wage-earners, who were
granted a number of rights that went against pure
market logic: minimum wage, right to retirement,
right to education, right to share in the fruits of eco-
nomic activity, etc. In the 1990s, in contrast, the
journalists of Business Week were advocating the
equivalent of a Brady Plan. It may be recalled that
this Plan had converted Latin American public debt
into securities tradeable on financial markets. In
1998 this proposal was expanded to cover the ab-
sorption of unpaid private debts owed to the banks.
This new “New Deal” thus referred to an institu-
tional arrangement between bank capital and finan-
cial capital, which is clear proof of the place now
occupied by finance, both in the United States and in
the newly industrialized countries. Incidentally, this
plan confirms that errors of management are not re-
stricted to governments or to Latin America but also
affect banks and private firms and can even affect
most Asian countries, though not all, as shown by
the example of Taiwan. A few years ago, these coun-
tries were still considered as possessing special
virtues (World Bank, 1993), and there was a danger
of underestimating the structural weaknesses which
had nevertheless been present for a long time in such
economies as South Korea or Indonesia (Hochraich,
1999; Godement, 1999).
However, these proposals completely overlook
the fact that unless there are new national commit-
ments to stabilize domestic demand the economies
hardest hit by the financial crisis will not be able to
recover their growth. It is important not to try to
solve the problem of over-production by exaggerated
reductions in export prices but, instead, to look for
ways of returning to the growth path through more
buoyant domestic demand and establishment of the
infrastructure needed for long-term development.
There are great needs in Asia, Latin America and
above all Russia, where a third of the population is
below the poverty line and the number of people in
this situation has grown steadily since 1995. The
main criticism that can be levelled at the IMF’s plans
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for the Asian countries is indeed that they aggravated
the contraction of domestic demand instead of stimu-
lating it, in contrast with the economic policy applied
by the OECD countries (lower short- and long-term
interest rates, increased public expenditure). Further-
more, there is an increasingly widespread conviction
that all national economies should base their eco-
nomic growth on improvements in their competitive-
ness: that is to say, they should adopt an export-led
model. This error would be all the more harmful be-
cause it would assume that the United States would
play the part of “consumer of last resort”.
VII
The paths open for the future:
multiple policy options
If we take the proposal for a new “New Deal” liter-
ally, then, it is essential that governments should
look for a broader range of options and adopt a strat-
egy better adapted to the diversity of political coali-
tions, the particular needs of specialization, and the
need for better international linkages. In the final
analysis, there will be as many strategies as there are
types of trajectories of the societies in question,
whose forms of regulation will continue to be very
different (Amable, Barré and Boyer, 1997). It is en-
couraging that there has been an increase in the num-
ber and variety of proposals since mid-1998 (figure
3). On the other hand, it is regrettable that the unex-
pected dynamism of the United States economy up to
mid-1999, the halt in the recession in Japan and the
lull in the problems of Europe have tended to put off
the implementation of these proposals.
The first strategy, proposed by British Prime
Minister Tony Blair, is to negotiate a new interna-
tional system. This proposal is supported by the
Keynesian-inspired economists and experts who pro-
pose a new international architecture (IMF, 1998a;
CAE, 1999a and b). What should have been a priority
item on the policy-makers’ agenda ever since 1971,
after the two oil shocks, and even more so after the
financial liberalization, has finally become a current
issue. But for this to happen we had to witness the
destructive effects of speculation in the 1990s, al-
though the December 1987 stock market crisis
should have sounded an alarm for both analysts and
policy-makers. The difficulty now lies in the content
of the reforms, since the different countries have dif-
ferent, if not downright contradictory interests, de-
pending on whether they are debtors or creditors,
whether they are responsible for a significant part of
international financial intermediation or not, and so
forth. The precedent of Bretton Woods suggests that
political and geopolitical factors predominate, since
in spite of the talents of John Maynard Keynes, the
United States plan was eventually imposed. This
seems to ensure that the initiatives of Washington
and New York, which are at the heart of the financial
globalization process, will be crowned with success,
and both the economic benefit of the United States
and its diplomatic leadership have been strengthened
over the last decade.
Containing the risk of contagion with bad debts
is a second option. In a sense, this would appear to
be easier to achieve, because it involves less political
opposition. The idea of a Brady Plan, taken up again
by Business Week, is logical up to a point because it
aims to make the banks and financial institutions
which have accumulated these bad debts pay part of
the cost of the adjustment, thus relieving the burden
on the public finances and on taxpayers, who gener-
ally have little capacity to privatize benefits and so-
cialize losses. There could also be a move towards
concentration, through mergers of big banking or fi-
nancial establishments at the international level. This
trend has already been observed in the United States
and Japan, but it could spread across national fron-
tiers and thus give rise to new international alliances.
Finally, the idea of strengthening the funds available
to the IMF for solving or forestalling international fi-
nancial crises (Camdessus, 1998) now appears to be
a priority, in spite of parliamentary opposition to
greater public expenditure, in view of the serious risk
of a systemic financial crisis perceived in the late
1990s. Furthermore, the independent Central Banks
must learn to operate in a more interdependent man-
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ner now that financial globalization has increased the
risk of instability (Aglietta and Cartelier, 1998).
Preventing future outbreaks of “irrational spec-
ulation” (to use the term employed in 1997 by Alan
Greenspan when he was trying to stop Wall Street
from getting out of control) is a third strategy whose
actual form will depend on various possible lines of
action which will ultimately prove very different
from each other.
The conservative tradition, basing itself on the
theory of moral hazard, recommends bankrupting all
speculators who are not able to pay their debts and
all bankers who have made too many mistakes. The
idea is that if they are sure that in future the public
authorities will not come to their rescue, financiers
will opt for more cautious evaluation of risks, so that
the next speculative bubble will be more moderate or
will actually be nipped in the bud. This is quite rea-
sonable, but in the meantime what is to be done if the
bad debts are so numerous that they endanger the
credibility of the whole financial system?
A more moderate solution is to strengthen the
prudential supervision regulations by, for example,
extending them to hedge funds or even raising the
amount of deposit insurance (BIS, 1998). Experience
shows, however, that such measures have not been
totally effective in recent years, for the nature of risk
shifts in line with the systems of protection set up,
FIGURE 3
How to surmount the financial globalization crisis:
an overview of the strategies open to governments
North American Free Monetary and political As a permanent As a short-term reaction
Trade Agreement, integration: the feature to the crisis
MERCOSUR European Union
6. Establishing or 5. Reforming national
strengthening regional institutions to adapt them
integration areas to the pursuit of financial
globalization
7. Redefining rules on international 4. Socializing losses at the
linkages (ranging from controls national level by nationalizing
on short-term capital to trade and subsidizing banks, without
protectionism) to protect special changing forms of regulation






1. Negotiating a new
international FINANCIAL GLOBALIZATION CRISIS
financial system
2. Eliminating the effects of international 3. Preventing waves of “irrational
contagion by bad debts speculation”
A Brady Plan Finance-based Expansion Driving all Reforming national and Penalizing
for private concentration at of IMF speculators and international financial short-term
debt the international resources bad financiers systems capital with a
level into bankruptcy “Tobin Tax”
Extension Better Efforts to Use of
of prudential risk rating achieve rollover
regulation greater options
transparency (UDROP)
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which in the opinion of some experts explains the se-
riousness of the Asian financial crisis: speculators
are very familiar with the previous IMF interventions
and adjust their strategies accordingly. Insurance
simply shifts, and may even increase, the risk.
It has therefore been proposed that the risk ap-
praisal procedures for banks and other financial insti-
tutions should also be reformed. In this case, the
public authorities would be responsible for ensuring
the certification and implementation of these proce-
dures. There can be no doubt that there has been an
improvement in the soundness of financial systems.
Nevertheless, the example of the near-failure of Long
Term Capital Management (a United States hedge
fund) shows that even the most expert advice on the
calculation of option values, provided by two Nobel
Prize winners who won that distinction precisely for
their work on option value theory, is no guarantee of
success (Croff, 1999), for when market opportunities
are exploited to the full their global properties
change or may be affected by unprecedented changes
(Rohatyn, 1999; Artus and Debonneuil, 1999).
A more ambitious and much more radical pro-
posal was put forward in 1978 by James Tobin: tax-
ing short-term capital at a rate which is very modest
but has a cumulative effect in penalizing speculation
and thus making long-term productive investment at-
tractive again. The situation existing in the 1990s has
given rise to renewed debates about such a reform
(Haq, Kaul and Grunberg, eds., 1996). The tradi-
tional objection to this proposal is that there will al-
ways be tax havens to which capital will flow, even if
the big industrialized countries were to agree on the
simultaneous, coordinated application of such a tax.
On the other hand, the example of Chile shows how
a country can unilaterally penalize speculative capital
or even prevent it from entering the country at all: it
is quite true that international capital flows turn away
from the country in the short term, but as soon as it
registers strong growth with high profit rates produc-
tive capital returns. Theoretical models indicate that
it is beneficial for a country to slow down short-term
capital movements, because the short-term losses are
amply offset by the medium- and long-term gains.
Indeed, the greater stability of the capital formation
process, the generation of learning effects and the re-
duction of uncertainty lead to more even and ulti-
mately stronger growth (Eliasson, 1984).
At a time which is totally dominated by the fi-
nancial markets’ perception of the credibility of eco-
nomic policies, many analysts feel that it is more
reasonable to aim for transparency of capital move-
ments (Davanne, 1998). By pooling real-time statisti-
cal data, the multinational authorities, aided by
governments, could make early diagnoses of im-
pending liquidity crises and prevent them from turn-
ing into systemic crises, the idea being that rational
agents would take these data fully into account and
eschew the imitative forms of behaviour which pre-
cipitate financial crises. Once again, however, finan-
cial history sheds some doubt on the sovereign
nature of this remedy (Kindleberger, 1978): in the
past, the sophistication of the information available
to the actors on financial markets has not prevented
the repetition of severe financial crises. Indeed, mod-
ern financial market theory shows that there is
nothing irrational about speculation and that rational
bubbles can form even under the transparency
hypothesis (Orléan, 1999). A measure of this type
is not useless –far from it– but it is not of itself suffi-
cient.
Other experts have proposed that liquidity crises
should be dealt with through the creation of options
markets capable of preventing a transitory and acci-
dental liquidity problem from turning first into a fi-
nancial crisis and then a major macroeconomic
crisis. The idea is that all debts denominated in for-
eign currency should be accompanied by an option,
usable at the borrower’s discretion, to postpone the
debt’s maturity by three to six months, subject to
payment of a penalty. The is the “Universal Debt
Rollover Option with a Penalty (UDROP)” proposed
by Buiter and Sibert (1999). The beauty of such a
measure is that it would not call for any public funds,
unlike interventions by the IMF or national Central
Banks, and it would heal the ills of the market
through the extension of market mechanisms: a ten-
dency which would fit in very well with the ideas of
the 1990s and after. Unfortunately, as long as liquid-
ity crises spread and get worse under the impact of
imitative behaviour, major financial imbalances will
continue to require public intervention, so that this
measure would have to fit in with the variety of in-
struments described earlier but could not take their
place.
Socializing losses through the fiscal budget is
the fourth option for dealing with the bad debt
buildup inherited from the 1990s. The argument put
forward in favour of this approach is that, over a cer-
tain threshold, private agents’ errors of management
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and foresight can compromise the viability of the
payments system as a whole, and with it the cohesion
of the domestic economy. There is nothing wrong,
then, with carrying out an act of national solidarity,
through the use of tax resources, to restore the dy-
namics of credit, investment and consumption. The
Japanese example shows that these measures are
highly unpopular, so that they can only be adopted
when the government is very strong or the crisis is so
devastating that it dispels the average citizen’s reluc-
tance to compensate some rich speculators for the
mistakes they have made. Nevertheless, most gov-
ernments, be they conservative or social democratic,
American or Scandinavian, have had to resort to this
method in order to avoid a possible collapse of the
entire banking and financial system. Even so, it is
reasonable to advance the moral hazard argument
when this is the only measure taken by governments:
when they are sure that they will not be allowed to
go bankrupt, banks and financiers will gaily indulge
once again in the delights of speculative bubbles.
A fifth solution would be to reorganize national
institutions in order to adapt them to the needs of in-
ternationalized finance. This is a solution proposed
by analysts who believe (even now!) that globaliza-
tion is an irreversible phenomenon and that once the
period of disturbances comes to an end the emerging
markets will begin to grow again even faster than be-
fore. Consequently, they say, it is necessary right
now to reform the fiscal structure, improve the qual-
ity of public infrastructure, and eliminate all the “ri-
gidities” from industrial relations by promoting
everywhere and at all times a rapid adjustment to the
unforeseeable situations generated by the generalized
spread of the “casino games” displayed by modern
finance in recent times. In fact, there is nothing irre-
versible about globalization (Boyer, 1997a and b),
and a change of course of the internationalization
process to take account of the limits observed in the
1990s is quite probable (Epstein, 1996 and Helleiner,
1996). Moreover, it is worth recalling the argument
put forward by Karl Polanyi (1946): societies run to
ruin if mercantile relations permeate such a central
institution as the currency and if they seek to com-
pletely dominate labour and the logic of the anthro-
pomorphic reproduction of generations (Aglietta and
Orléan (eds.), 1998). For its part, the General Theory
long ago showed that it was futile to try to return to
full employment by making wages as flexible as
stock market prices. Finally, and above all,
regulationist studies suggest that it was the firmness
of the original commitment between capital and la-
bour and the strict circumscription of finance which
made possible such rapid and even growth after the
second world war (Boyer, 1999b). Despite appear-
ances and the relative weakness of the organizations
for the defence of wages, the negotiation of a verita-
ble “New Deal” between employers and workers
must be high on the agenda, not only because it fits
in with the needs of short-term adjustment but also
because it must be the ongoing characteristic of a
form of development which would also take account
of the dynamics of social needs in each society and
not just export competitiveness.
Another option open to national leaders is to set
up regional integration areas. Thus, it is seen that
trade does tend to increase in the three poles of the
triad: this is very clear in the case of Europe and is
also to be observed in the case of North America
with NAFTA (a later and less vigorous movement) and
also in Latin America with MERCOSUR and other
trade agreements. In the Asian countries, however, it
is only an embryonic phenomenon, and this has in-
creased the seriousness of their crises, for all these
countries must find outlets outside Asia, thus leading
to a depressive spiral within their own area. In con-
trast, the establishment of the Euro received unex-
pected support when the 1997 and 1998 financial
crises occurred: it was seen that the currencies in the
Euro basket remained stable, whereas the currencies
outside it suffered notable changes in their exchange
rates. It is in such spaces (Europe and North Amer-
ica) that supranational, but not necessarily
world-level, institutions can try to discipline finance
and organize competition so as to maximize its fa-
vourable effects for the area as a whole. In this re-
spect, political integration can be more effective than
the establishment of a mere free trade area, as is sug-
gested by the differences between the paths followed
by Europe and Southeast Asia in the 1990s. Like-
wise, the tensions registered in 1999 in MERCOSUR
suggest that a free trade area should include coordi-
nation of monetary and exchange rate policies, which
means giving up part of national sovereignty in the
interest of joint decisions. A movement which has
taken almost half a century in Europe (Boyer, 1998)
cannot be carried out elsewhere within the time lim-
its demanded by the present financial globalization.
This is a serious difficulty, of a political and not just
an economic and financial nature, which stands in
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the way of the establishment of regional integration
areas (Frémeaux, 1998).
States always have the option of redefining their
international linkages. Some governments may
rightly consider that it is finance which has
destabilized national forms of organization and
brought on crises. While continuing to seek their
place in an international division of labour which
stimulates innovation and improves production meth-
ods and standards of living, countries can neverthe-
less more or less radically restrict the circulation of
financial capital or at least impose precise rules on its
entry. Such a movement would be more or less the
opposite to the “Multinational Investment Agree-
ment” (MIA) which is being negotiated under the aus-
pices of the OECD but has been held up by strong
opposition. The measures taken by Malaysia show
that the internationalization process can suffer some
setbacks as a result of major crises which shed
doubts on the viability of the previous form of inter-
national linkages. If the financial crisis were to get
worse, this type of strategy could begin to be copied
by other countries, regardless of what the advocates
of the superiority of total free trade may think, al-
though on the other hand, what has happened be-
tween 1997 and 1999 gives no indication of an
impending catastrophe like that announced by coun-
tries such as Malaysia, which have tried to free them-
selves from short-term capital movements.
Organizing a withdrawal into protectionism, even
at the cost of a rebirth of nationalism (and not only in
economic matters), would be the last option that some
governments might be tempted to explore, if they had
not been able to carry out any of the preceding strate-
gies successfully. The example of the period between
the wars shows that some events, if sufficiently dra-
matic, could bring this strategy up again as a possi-
bility, even though an ex post facto analysis would
show that it would lead to even greater evils than
those caused by international finance at its worst. In
the light of these problems, the political and eco-
nomic disturbances observed since August 1998 give
grounds for thinking that one of the first candidates
for adopting such a strategy might be Russia.
VIII
Conclusions
At the beginning of the 1990s it was fashionable to
talk about “the end of history”, on the grounds that
the confrontation between the antagonistic social and
political regimes of capitalism on the one side and
communism on the other had come to an end.
However, those who believed this had forgotten the
extraordinary innovative capacity of capitalism and
above all of finance. In the space of only a decade,
internationalization and the predominance of a
finance-based approach have changed the world and
radically altered the situation of capitalism. The po-
litical agenda has been totally transformed, and the
authorities now have a dual task: first, and above all,
to “domesticate” finance and the market again and
make them into means for ensuring the welfare of
societies rather than as final objectives in them-
selves, and second, to renovate international commit-
ments so that they will give rise to forms of growth
that do not make exporting at all costs the basic
mainspring of each country’s economic and social
growth.
It is quite true that the buoyant growth of the
United States, the resurgence of the Japanese econ-
omy and the establishment of the Euro have given
grounds for renewed optimism and that many ana-
lysts think that the renewed economic dynamism will
make it possible to avoid the return of the financial
instability of the past without making any major re-
forms. Nevertheless, the imbalances that appeared in
the 1990s are still with us and could surge up again
if, for example, the United States economy were to
go into a recession. That would indeed be the touch-
stone of true reality: the “New Economy” on the one
hand and the viability of the present international
configuration on the other.
For this reason, a genuine New Deal is and must
continue to be high on the world agenda.
(Original: French)
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